Bhaskaruni Palani Sai Krishna, Y Sravana Sandhya


Lately, cloud providers have introduced auction-based models for VM provisioning and allocation which permits users to submit bids for his or her requested VMs. We formulate the dynamic VM provisioning and allocation problem for that auction-based model being an integer program thinking about multiple kinds of sources. A significant challenging problem for cloud providers is designing efficient mechanisms for virtual machine (VM) provisioning and allocation. Such mechanisms let the cloud providers to effectively utilize their available sources and acquire greater profits. Then we design truthful greedy and optimal mechanisms for that problem so that the cloud provider provisions VMs in line with the demands from the winning users and determines their debts. Our suggested mechanisms achieve promising results when it comes to revenue for that cloud provider. We perform extensive experiments using real workload traces to be able to investigate performance from the suggested mechanisms. We reveal that the suggested mechanisms are truthful, that's, you don't have incentives to control the machine by laying regarding their requested bundles of VM instances as well as their valuations.


Cloud Computing; Truthful Mechanism; Virtual Machine Provisioning; Dynamic Resource Allocation; Greedy Heuristics


N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007.

Z. Kong, C.-Z. Xu, and M. Guo, “Mechanism Design for Stochastic Virtual Resource Allocation in Non-Cooperative Cloud Systems,” Proc. IEEE Fourth Int’l Conf. Cloud Computing, pp. 614-621, 2011.

V. Di Valerio, V. Cardellini, and F. Lo Presti, “Optimal Pricing and Service Provisioning Strategies in Cloud Systems: A Stackelberg Game Approach,” Proc. IEEE Sixth Int’l Conf. Cloud Computing, pp. 115-122, 2013.

S. Zaman and D. Grosu, “Combinatorial Auction-Based Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation in Clouds,” Proc. IEEE Third Int’l Conf. Cloud Computing Technology and Science, pp. 107-114, 2011.

G.S. Kasbekar and S. Sarkar, “Spectrum Auction Framework for Access Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 1841-1854, Dec. 2010.

Full Text: PDF


  • There are currently no refbacks.

Copyright © 2012 - 2021, All rights reserved.|

Creative Commons License
International Journal of Innovative Technology and Research is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.Based on a work at IJITR , Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at